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MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY: PURCHASE OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE AS A WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
The maxim, "The King can do no wrong," is commonly said to be the
foundation upon which the immunity from suit of the state and of the city
is based. The law that has resulted from this ancient maxim is presently
in a state of chaos and confusion. The instability in this area is not surprising because in dealing with the problem of municipal liabilty, the
courts have been attemptng to find a middle ground between two conflicting policy considerations. On the one hand, there is the common law
concept of immunity. On the other, there is the belief that the risk of
wrongful injury should not be borne by the individual, but by society.
By society, it is meant that particular group, whether it be the population
of a city, county or state which is represented by a governmental unit, who
receives the benefits, services and derives the good out of that unit's activities. The idea that risk of wrongful injury should be borne by that segment
of the citizenry which enjoys the services and benefits is a result of the
concept that he who enjoys the benefits should bear the cost. This second
consideration, based on the unfairness to the innocent victim of a principle
of nonliability, and the social desirability of distributing the loss, is merely
a manifestation of a trend which is becoming more and more evident in
other fields.1 Some jurisdictions rigidly adhere to the immunity rule
while others have made inroads upon it through piecemeal imposition of
liability. 2 Still other courts have found legislatively imposed liability by
a liberal construction of statutes empowering municipal corporations to
"sue or be sued," abandoning the traditional interpretation of such statutes
as waiving only the immunity of the government from suit and not from
liability. 3
Wyoming courts have strongly adhered to the doctrine of municipal
immunity. In the latest reaffirmance of such adherence, Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer (1959) 4, the court was asked to renounce this
generally recognized doctrine and to judicially declare that which is alleged
to be the better rule. This the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to do.
To the contrary, it reaffirmed the municipal immunity rule in the performance of governmental functions in Wyoming. The court felt that
Wyoming was unquestionably committed to the acceptance of the doctrine
of municipal immunity, absent a statutory provision to the contrary. The
case precipitated immediate legislation in the 1961 session. By the Laws of
1961, Chapter 81, cities and towns were authorized to carry liability in1. See Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
437, (1941).
2. Vacin, Municipal Corporations-Liabilityin Tort, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 379, 380, (1962).

Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1363, (1945),
which briefly summarizes the highlights of each state.
3. St. Julian v. State,
La.
, 82 So. 2d 85 (La. 1955).
4. Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808, (1959).
5. Wyo. Stat. §§ 15-20.6 to 20.10 (Supp. 1963).
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surance.5 The purpose of this article is to investigate how this new statute
will effect the present law.
To put the new statute and the old rule into a proper perspective for
purposes of analysis and predictability ,one must first have a background
of the rules and the forces which have acted upon it. Although commonly,
the 1788 case of Russell v. The Men of Devon o is considered the start of
the rule of immunity, several authorities believe that the rule had its
genesis much earlier. Nevertheless, with th-e sovereign concept as a foundation, Russell v. The Men of Devon became the principal case establishing
municipal non-liability in torts. But many authorities have distinguished
this case from the modern problem. "The Russell case involved an unincorporated county; the modern problems involve incorporated cities. When
the courts of this country were confronted with a problem of similar circumstances but affecting towns which were incorporated arid with funds, they
applied the doctrine of non-liability to American towns which was applied
to the unincorporated county without funds in the Russell case. This was
clearly mis-application of the precedent established in the Russell decision.
However, the doctrine with its many variations, inconsistencies, and exceptions in application has been widely accepted and has become the
American doctrine of municipal tort immunity."- A fundamental reason
for the long continued interest and concern with the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is perhaps dissatisfaction with the principle founded and built
upon this decision which embodies feudal concepts and political theories
of the Middle Ages, that is, non-applicability of the doctrine of respondeat
superior. It was not until stare decisis had done its work and the doctrine
had been accepted in this country, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was introduced as a rationalization of the result. In our early American
history, municipal corporations were placed upon the same footing as
private corporations in so far as tort liability was concerned, and sovereign
immunity was not extended to them., This was changed in 1842 when the
landmark Bailey case was decidedO, and since then the fundamental legal
principle underlying municipal tort liability has remained unchanged.
Thus was evolved the municipal tort liability doctrine-that a city has
both proprietary and governmental functions and that it may be liable
for torts arising out of the former but not the latter .
Historically, the proponents of
a convincing case for its retention.
on social policy rather than legal
agencies engage in activities of a
any private business, which affect

the immunity rule have failed to make
Arguments for the rule must be based
maxims. These are, first, that public
scope and variety far beyond that of
a much larger number of the public

6. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (KB 1788).
7. See Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the State, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1863,
(1945) ; McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820, (1960); Prosser, Torts
(2d Ed. 1955); See also Torts-Municipal Corporation, 27 Mo. L. Rev. 224, (1962).
8. People v. Albany, 11 Wend (NY) 539, 27 Am. Dec. 95, (1934); Martin v. Brooklyn,
1 Hill (NY) 545 (1841).

9. Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill (NY) 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (1842).
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than do the activities of private enterprise. Many of the activities carried
on by government are of a nature so inherently dangerous that no private
entity would undertake the risk of performing them. It is argued that
government is not free, as would be private industry, to discontinue these
functions because of high cost of operation or because liability for continuing them is too great. Police protection, fire protection and health
services cannot be cut back. It is said that a rule imposing liability in
these areas would result in the curtailment of socially desirable public
activities, causing evil effects disapproportionate to the benefits which
would flow from a doctrine of liability.
As stated above, the development of the law has been in the nature
of a series of inroads. An examination of the cases in which these inroads were made reveals a series of distinctions being made which, for
historical reasons appear to represent valid differences. It has been
clear for some time that there has been no absolute municipal immunity
from liability. The problem has been in determining what are the requisities for liability. The first inroad or limitation to be made on the immunity doctrine was the governmental-proprietary (lichotomy.' ° Under
this, the first relevant determination in the case of negligence by a municipal corporation was a characterization as to the nature of the functional
exercise which gave rise to the tort. In effect, this determination resolved
the question of whether immunity existed, or conversely, whether liability
was possible. Under this basic test, immunity was accorded where the
function was governmental and liability was imposed where it was proprietary. No tort liability attaches with respect to the exercise of governmental functions because the city performs such functions under powers
delegated by the state and under the same immunity enjoyed by the
state.'' On the other hand, in the exercise of proprietary functions or the
performance of acts for the benefit of the corporation, a city stands on
12
the same footing as any private corporation as to its liability for torts.
10. See, generally, Antieau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 40 Ky. L.J.
131 (1952) ; aBrnett. The Foundation of the Distinction Between Public and Private
Functions, 16 Ore. L. Rev. 250 (1937); Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability
in Operation., 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437, (1941); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48
Mich. L. Rev. 41, (1949). "Apparently the purpose has been to confine the protection afforded to only those activities which have traditionally been considered
'necessary' to government, and to exclude from coverage those activities which are
merely conveniently carried on by government instead of by private enterprise.
This nineteenth century dichotomy was the judicial compromise struck between
complete protection of public funds and complete protection of individuals tortiosly
injured by government agents. Both the basis of the distinction and its application,
which has been difficult and artificial, have widely been regraded as less than
satisfactory." Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal
Tort Liability, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942).
11. Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n., 29 Wyo. 391, 213 Pac 938 (1923); Ramirez v.
City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710, 42 A.L.R. 245 (1925); Villalpando v.
City of Cheyenne, 51 Wyo. .00, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937), Densmore v. Birmingham,
223 Ala. 210, 135 So. 320 (1931); Lambert v. New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A.2d
923, (1943); Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 195 Atd. 571 (1937).
12. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac 710, 42 A.L.R. 245, (1925); Maffei
v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808, (1959); Hooton v.
Burley, 70 Idaho 369, 219 P.2d 651, (1951); Perry v. Wichita, 174 Kan. 264, 255
P.2d 667, (1953); Bishop v. Meridan, 223 Miss. 703, 79 So. 2d 221, (1955); Grimesland v. Washington. 234 N.C. 117. 66 S.E. 21 794. (1951).
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The determination of the governmental-proprietary issue in any given
case is a question of law for the court, not the jury,13 and doubt is to be
resolved, in a few jurisdictions, in favor of holding the activity in question
governmental in nature. 14 Various tests were evolved for the purpose of
determining into which category a particular tort fell. The "profit" test
looked primarily at the nature of the function involved to determine
whether or not the municipality engaged in the activity for profit thus
making it a proprietary function. Under the "agent" test, an inquiry is
made to determine whether the municipality was acting as the agent of the
state in furthering the state policy, or whether it was acting primarily on
behalf of the citizens of the community. In this attempt at distinguishing
the functions, no satisfactory criteria could be devised. Most jurisdictions
have set up some rather vague general guidelines. Usually, activities in
the area of fire prevention, law enforcement, education, health, and general
government, are governmental. But municipal railways, gas, streets, sidewalks, bridges and sewers are governmental in some jurisdictions and proprietary in others.',
The almost universal dissatisfaction with the rule of municipal immunity from tort liability has lead to its being subjected to a number of
other restrictions and qualifications designed to hold the municipality
liable under some circumstances. A distinction has been made between
contract and tort actions, on the theory that an award of contract damages
indirectly benefits the government body by encouraging persons to contract with it, while a tort recovery yields no such advantage.1 6 The
"nuisance theory" has generally held a municipality liable for injuries
resulting from the creation or maintenance of a nuisance.1 7 The so-called
"active wrongdoing" test, that is, drawing a distinction between municipal
misfeasance and nonfeasance, is sometimes used to determine tort liability.
Thus, it has been held that a city is liable for positive misfeasance or active
wrongdoing but is immune for nonfeasance.' 8
13. Hanson v. Los Angeles, 63 Cal. App. 2d 426, 147 P.2d 109, 110, (1944).
14. "Activity of a municipality is presummed to be governmental rather than proprietary." Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152, (1957); Hayes v.
Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E. 2d 726, (1944).
15. 63 C.J.S., Mun. Corp. §§ 873 to 877. 28 Am. Jur., Mun. Corp., §§ 571 to 667. "A
municipality is liable for damages arising out of its negligence in the maintenance
of a sewer system; sewer maintenance is a proprietary function for which there is
liability." Lore v. Town of Douglas, 355 P.2d 367 (1960).

16. See Florey v. Burlington, 247 Iowa 316, 73 N.W. 2d 770, (1955).
17. "A municipal corporation is not liable for injuries to children on theory of attractive nuisance, where its servants' negligence occurred or attractive condition was
created in exercise of governmental function." Wilson v. City of Larainie, 65
Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119, (1948); See also, Annotation, "Role of municipal immunity
from liability for acts in performance of governmental functions as applicable in
case of personal injury or death as a result of nuisance," 75 A.L.R. 1196.
18. Van Zandt v. Bergen County, 79 F.2d 506 (3rd Cir. 1935); Pennsylvania R. R. v.

United States, 124 F. Supp. 52 (N.J. 1954) ; Milstrey v. Hackensack, 6 N.J. 400, 79
A.2d 37,

(1951) ; Casey v. Bridgewater Tp., 107 N.J. L. 163, 151 Atil. 603,

(1930);

McKeown v. Chicago, 319 Ill. App. 563, 49 N.E. 2d 729, (1943) ; Hartman v. Brigantine, 23 N.J. 530, 129 A.2d 876, (1957) ; See also, Repka, American Legal Commen-

tary on the Doctrine of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 214,
(1942).
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These illustrations should demonstrate that many courts do not like
the doctrine of governmental immunity and will go to great lengths to get
around it any time it is squarely put to them. In the past three or four
years, the high courts of eight states have laid aside these multifarious
distinctions in favor of a judicial abrogation of the ancient common law
immunity rule in spite of the fact that these same courts had prior thereto
said that this matter should be left up to the state legislature.' 9 A court
which is ready to abandon the doctrine of governmental immunity has an
almost inexhaustible source from which it may draw as the basis for a
denunciation of the theory of immunity.2 0
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from liability
for torts rests on a rotten foundation. It is almost incredible
that in this modern age of comparative sociological enlightenment, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in the
maxim, "The King can do no wrong," should exempt the various
branches of government from their wrongful acts and should be
imposed upon the single individual who suffers the injury,
rather than distributed among the entire community constituting the government, where it could be borne without hardship
2
upon any individual and where it justly belongs. 1
. . . If the doctrine of state immunity in tort survives by virtue
of antiquity alone, this is an historical anachronism, which manifests
an inefficient public policy and works injustice to everyone con22
cerned.
Probably the most forceful rationale against the doctrine comes from
the Michigan decision which abrogates the doctrine, William v. City of
Detroit.
Little time need be spent in determining whether the strict
doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability should be repudiated. All this is old straw. The question is not "should we"it is "how may the body be interred judicially with non-discriminatory last rites?" No longer does any eminent scholar or jurist
attempt justification thereof . . . from this date forward, the
judicial doctrine of government immunity from ordinary torts no
longer exists in Michigan. In this case, we overrule preceding
court made law to the contrary. We eliminate from the case law
of Michigan an ancient rule inherited from the days of absolute
19. Florida in Hardgrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 90 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Arizona
in Stone v. State Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963) ; California
in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rep. 89, 359 P.2d
457, (1961); Hawaii in Kamar and Cushnie v. Hawaii County, 41 Hawaii 527, (1957);
Illinois, Moletor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 Ill. 2d 18, 163 N.E. 2d
89, (1959); Michigan in Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.
2d 1, (1961); Minnesota in Spanel v. Moundsview School District, 118 N.W. 2d
795 (Minn. 1962); Wisconsin in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115

N.W. 2d 618, (1962).
20. The classic reference is Professor Borchard. Governmental Liability in Tort, an
eight part article, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229; 36 Yale L.J. 759, 1039: 28 Col. L. Rev.
577, 594, 734.
21. Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District, 348 Il. App. 567,
109 N.E. 2d 636, 640. Annotation, 75 A.L.R. 1196.
22. Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 Va. L. Rev. 97, 108.
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monarchy which has been productive of great injustice to our
trend in this country toward
courts. By so doing, we join a major
28
the righting of an age-old wrong.
The Williams case and like decisions in the seven other states show
one side of a historic tug of war. This tug of war is represented by the
pulling for the legislative prerogative of abrogation of public policy on
one hand and the urging for the judicial prerogative on the other. Other
cases indicative of the disdainful attitude adopted by the judiciary at the
inactivity of the legislature are Purce v. Yakima and Muskoff v. Corning
Hospital District24 which agreed that the docrtine was judicially created
and that its rejection was not the exclusive province of the legislature.
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee25 , the case which abrogated the doctrine for
the State of Wisconsin, states, "so far as governmental responsibility for
torts is concerned, the rule is liability-the exception is immunity." McAndrew v. Mularchuk2u held that there was no municipal immunity in
case of negligent acts committed by a municipal corporation saying, "surely
it cannot be successfully argued that an outmoded, inequitable and artificial curtailment of a general rule of action created by the judicial branch
of the government cannot or should not be removed by its creator."
Perhaps the strongest argument for the abandonment of the sovereign
immunity doctrine is its inconsistency with the modern socio-ethical notion
that the risk of wrongful injury should not be borne by the individual upon
whom the misadventure fortuitously falls, but by the segment of society
that benefits from the activity that produces the injury. Another argument
is the more extensive activity of government which results in a greater
likelihood of injuries to individuals. Thus, it has been urged that compensation of government tort victims should be viewed as a justifiable
and expected cost of modern government.21
When there is an abrogation of the doctrine, even its worst enemies
conclude that experience indicates that some restraint is necessary for the
protection of public funds. In almost every case, there has been a reaction
from the legislature or the judiciary itself, which either implements the
rule and supplies the necessary safeguards or restores the rule of immunity.28
23. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W. 2d 1, (1961). The Williams'
case explained itself by saying, "it is only as to those harms which are torts that
governmental bodies are to be liable by reason of this decision."
24. Purce v. Yakima, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (1953); Murkoff v. Corning

Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rep. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).

25. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26. 115 N.W. 2d 618, (1962)..
26. McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820, 832, (1960).
27. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L.J. 583. 720.
(1929) ; Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types
of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. Rev. 805, (1930).
28. Moreno v. Aldrick, 113 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1959); Williams v. City of Detroit, 369
Mich. 231, 111 N.W. 2d 1; McDowell v. Markie, 265 Mich. 268, 112 N.W. 2d 491
(1961).
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By contrast, the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the Maffei case - disagreed that the basis of immunity was judicial. The court felt that the
doctrine of municipal immunity became the rule in our state by statute
and it is only by statute that the doctrine can be abrogated. The statute
is Wyo. Stat. § 8-17 (1957) which provides that the common law of England (as of 1607) shall be the rule of decision in Wyoming. The Wyoming
court understood that the Devon case clearly indicates that antecedent to
Russell v. The Men of Devon, a judicial pronouncement had recognized the doctrine of municipal immunity. This antecedent pronouncement was found in a 1586 edition of Brook's, La Graunde Abridgement,
therefore the doctrine of municipal immunity was part of the English common law as of 1607. Thus, by statute, the doctrine of municipal immunity
became the rule of decision in our state, and it is only by statute that the
doctrine can be abrogated. Our Supreme Court feels it cannot abolish
the doctrine by judicial decree. Neither would our court adopt the idea
that the 1788 judicial recognition of the common law of English amounted
to a court originated doctrine. Rather they believed that the doctrine
was already a part of the common law, through long use and custom. In
commenting on the harsh language hurled at the doctrine by various indignant courts, Justice Harnsberger adds:
The harsh language thus used adds nothing to persuasiveness.
It rather serves to emphasize the impropriety of courts of law assuming to base their decision on their own concept of sociological
enlightenment rather than avail legislative reaction to such claimed
modern advancements.
More support for the hypothesis that the abrogation of the doctrine is
properly legislative can be found in Ramirez v. Cheyenne.30 Missouri
courts have also indicated that government immunity is to be retained
until the legislature decides otherwise. 31 "While most courts may admit the
glaring defects in the present law, they feel that any changes that should
be made must be left to the wisdom of the legislature.' '32 In many jurisdictions of secure consistency, the rule of thumb formula, government function-no liability, proprietary function-liability, is still producing rather
33
normal legal results.

29. Supra, Footnote 4.
30. Ramirez v. Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710, 42 A.L.R. 245 (1925). See also,
38 Am. Jur. sec. 573. Recent Texas' cases have recognized the restriction on the
power of the courts to legislate. Hill v. Palms, 237 S.W. 2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951); Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Company, 249 S.W. 2d 227

(Tex.

Civ. App. 1952); Harned v. E-Z Finance Company, 151 641, 254 S.W. 2d 81, (1953).
31. Schweskert v. Kansas City, decided by Kansas City Court of Appeals on June 4,
1962, (unreported), 26 MINLO Municipal Law Rev. 454, 455; Fette v. St. Louis
(Mo.), 366 S.W. 2d 446, (1964) (Missouri Supreme Court).
32. McGraw v. Rural High School District No. 1, Linn County, 120 Kan. 413, 414; 243
Pac. 1038, 1039.
33. See Burke v. City of St. Louis, 349 S.W. 2d 930 (Mo. 1961); Taylor v. Kansas City,
353 S.W. 2d 814 (Mo. 1961); Myers v. Palmyra, 355 S.W. 2d 17 (Mo. 1962); Dugan
v. City of Portland, 157 Me. 521, 174 A.2d 660 (1961); Cook v. City of Shreveport,
134 So. 2d 582 (La. 1962) ; Locigno v. City of Chicago, 32 Ill. App. 2d 412, 178 N.E.
2d 124 (1961); Cobin v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961).
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Whatever side of the tug of war wins, there is clearly a present
tendency against the doctrine of governmental immunity. However, the
doctrine is still a well-settled rule in this country. The doctrine is generally
considered to rest upon, or to have its source in three grounds: (A) the
supposed immunity of the sovereign from suit, which is extended to the
municipality as a representative or agency of the sovereign, (B) the
idea that it is more expedient that scattered individuals suffer than that
the public in general be inconvenienced and (C) the considerations of
public policy involved in the theory that government agents will perform
4
their duties more effectively if not hampered by fear of tort liability.
The rule continues to be applied by the overwhelming majority of courts in
this country, and although judicial criticism of the rule is not infrequent, a
it has been said that the tendency is to restrict rather than to extend
the principle of immunity,-", The courts have usually concluded that the
doctrine is so well entrenched that relief against it must come, if at all,
7
from the legislature3
Even while Professor Borchard's writing dwells at length upon the desirability of abrogating the doctrine of municipal immunity, he feels that
in the United States only statutes can abolish the outmoded, unjust maxims
that "The King can do no wrong" and "states are above the law and
cannot even be sued." But nowhere does Professor Borchard claim that it
is the modern tendency of courts to abolish the rule of nonliability of
municipal corporations.
It is obvious that a comprehensive solution cannot be worked out
by the judiciary. The court lacks the facilities for an examination
of the social, economic and political considerations which must delineate the limits of liability. This problem can only be worked
out by the legislature, where all public agencies and other in31. See An Inquiry into the Principles of Municipal Responsibility in General Assuinpsit
and Tort, 8 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 753, 765.
35. Arkansas, Kirksey v. Ft. Smith, S.W. 2d 257 (Ark. 1957); Kansas, Wendler v. Great
Bend 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265 (1957: Utah, Niblock v. Salt Lake City 100 Utah
573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941), Bingham v. Board of Education 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d
423 (1950); Wisconsin, Britten v. Eau Claire 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1952).
Also, Supra footnote 19.
36. California, Madison v. San Francisco 106 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d
141 (1951); Illinois, Both v. Collins 339 I11. App. 437, 90 N.E. 2d 285 (1950); Iowa,
Brown v. Sioux City 242 Iowa 1196, 49 N.W. 2d 853 (1951)
Kansas, Krantz v.
Hutchinson, 165 Kan. 449, 196 P.2d 227, 5 A.L.R. 2d 47 (1948); Wendler v. Great
Bend 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265 (1957); Minnesota, Hahn v. Ortonville, 238 Minn.
428, 57 N.W. 2d 254 (1953); New Jersey, Housing Authority v. Trust Company of
New Jersey, 136 A.2d 401 (1957); Oklahoma, Tulsa v. Washington 206 Okla. 61,
241 P.2d 194 (1952) ; Texas, Parson v. Texas City 259 S.W. 2d 333 (1953) ; Wisconsin, Britten v. Eau Claire 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1953).
Also see, 38 Anl.
Jur. sec. 573, p. 266.
37. Maffie v. Incorporated Town of Kemnmnerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959):
Kirksey v. Ft. Smith, 300 S.W. 2d 257 (Ark. 1957); Flory v. Burlington, 247 Iowa
316, 73 N.W. 2d 770 (1955); Nissen %. Redelack, 246 Minn. 83, 74 N.W. 2d 300.
55 A.I,.R. 2d 1428 (1955) ; Wickien v. Housing Authority, 196 Or. 100, 247 P.2d
30 (1953); Parson v. Texas City 259 S.W. 2d 333 (Tex. 1953); Scates v. Board of
Corers., 196 Tenn. 274, 265 S.W. 2d 563 (1954); Kilbourn v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d
373, 261 P.2d 407 (1953) ; Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E. 2d 726, 156
A.L.R. 602 (1944) ; Britten v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1952).
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terested parties will have opportunity to appear before the appropriate committee to explain their problems and proposed solutions. The special capacity to define and condition the terms
of liability is to be found in the legislature and not in the
judiciary.3 8
As stated above, immediately after the Maffei case, the legislature
of Wyoming enacted a statute allowing cities and towns to carry liability
insurance. 39 This appears to be a step in the right direction and one
which was needed to off-set the harsh results of the common law doctrine.
The statute provides that cities and towns are authorized to carry liability
insurance in any amount deemed necessary by such town or city, and that
any person suffering damages from negligent acts of such cities or towns
so insured may maintain action for damages against the city or town
in an amount not exceeding the limits of the policy. An insured city or
town may not plead governmental immunity as a defense in any action
for the negligent acts of cities and towns, their officers, or employees in
the performance of governmental functions.
Many problems can be visualized which makes one wonder whether the
act is sufficient. First of all ,the act is clearly permissive and the cities and
towns are free to decide for themselves whether or not they want to spend
city funds on insurance. Hence, if a city does not carry such insurance, the
innocent victim is still in the same position of not being compensated
for his losses suffered as a result of some city's wrongful acts. Next, the
act applies only to cities and towns of Wyoming. It does not apply to the
State, the counties, the many State agencies, irrigation districts, school
districts ,or any one of the many other political subdivisions exercising
duties for the public good or benefit. As a result, if one happens to be
the victim of a misadventure caused by one of these entities, the docrtine
or sovereign immunity would be a bar to any type of just compensation.
Another obvious inadequacy of the act is that it allows recovery in damages
in an amount not to exceed the limit or limits of the insurance policy or
policies carried by the municipality. All an innocent victim can do is
hope that the policy limit adequate. As of this date, no litigation involving this municipal liability insurance has occurred in Wyoming, but upon
its instigation, many other defects and inadequacies will undoubtedly arise.
This Wyoming act exemplifies a recent trend on the part of state and
local government to purchase insurance to cover activities in which they
engage, and in which they enjoy a sovereign immunity from tort liability.
This trend is probably prompted either by a public awareness of the situation caused by a "Maffei" case or a benevolent legislature which feels
that some sort of risk-distribution plan is needed. The existence of insurance as a feasible risk-distribution device is the most persuasive reason
for modifying the sovereign immunity doctrine, and the insurance in38. Annotation, 68 A.L.R. 2d 1437, quoting Professor Borchard.
39. Supra, Footnote 5.
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dustry is the most likely spur to future legislation. There appear to
be four reasons why municipalities have procured insurance to cover immune activities: (A) the purpose may be to obtain the insurer's services in
defending suits against it; (B) w here the law relating to a particular
activity is unclear, the purpose may be to place the risk of an adverse
judicial determination on the insurer, and even where immunity at the
present time clearly attaches, the insurer would bear the risk that the law
might be modified during the term of the contract; (C) the purpose may
be to protect members of the public injured by government employees;
(D) finally, the purpose may be to protect government agents who remain
personally liable for their torts. Most states now authorize the purchase
of liability insurance covering immune govermental activities. 40 The
statutes authorizing the purchase of liability insurance for immune governmental functions4 1 have generally been directed at specific problem areas,
i.e. the much litigated school bus accident situation, 42 or municipal vehicles
involved in fire or police protection. Several states have gone further
and authorized the insurance of all state-owned motor vehicles. 43 Although most of these statutes are permissive only, like Wyoming's, a growing number of states have enacted mandatory liability insurance for their
44
municipalities.
This statute authorizing the purchase of liability insurance by cities
and towns in Wyoming, as mentioned before, is certainly a step in the right
direction. The only criticism is that the statute failed to go far enough.
In Wyoming a governmental unit lacks the power to waive immunity and
40. There appears to be no question that a municipal government entity can insure
against liability for "proprietary" functions. The leading case is Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Village of Wadsworth, 109 Ohio St. 440, 142 N.E. 900 (1924). The reason upholding such a purchase is that the functions might be endangered by tort suits
without the insurance.
41. The following is a listing of the statutes enacted: Ark. Stats., § 66-517 (1947); Cal.
Vehicle Code Ann., § 400 (1956) ; Gen. Stat. Conn. Rev., § 52-536 (1958) ; Del. Code
Ann. title 14, § 2904 (1953) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 41-3304-06 (Supp. 1957) ; Fla. Stat.
Ann., § 240.28 (1957); Ga. Code Ann., §§ 32-429, 32-431 (1952); Ind. Stat. Ann. §
38-1819 (1952); Iowa Code § 368A (12, 517A (1) (1958) ; Kan Ben. Stat. Ann. §
72-615 (Supp. 1957); Minn. Stat. Ann., § 471-42-43 (Supp. 1958); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann., § 40-1204 (Supp. 1959)" N.J. Stat. Ann., § 18:5-50.4 (Supp. 1959); N.M. Rev.
Code, § 64-23-8.9 (1953); N.C. Gen. Stat., § 160-191.1 (1952); N.D. Rev. Code, §§
15-4731, 39-0108 (Supp. 1953), Ohio Rev. Code Ann., §§ 307.44; 3327.09 (Baldwin
1953); Okla. Stat. title 69, § 30.16-18, title 70, § 9.7 (Supp. 1957); Ore. Rev. Stat.,
§§ 278.090, 332.180 (1953) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. title 24, § 7-774 (1950), title 71, § 634 (b)
(Supp. 1958); S.D. Laws, C. 199 (1955); Vt. Laws No. 243, § 5 (1949); Va. Code
Ann., § 22.284-294 (1950); Wash. Rev. Code, § 28.58.100(11) (1950); W. Va. Code
Ann., § 1774 (7) (Michie 1949) ; Wis. Stat., § 40.57 (1957) ; Wyo. Stat., § 15-20.6
(Supp. 1963).
42. Every statute listed in note 41 supra, covers the school bus problem with the exception of that of South Dakota and Wyoming. The following are states whose
statutes authorize only school bus insurance: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho.
Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and
Wisconsin. See Wyo. Stat. § 21-154 (1957) which covers the school but problem
separately.
43. The following states authorize insurance for all state-owned motor vehicles: California, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota. Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia.
44. Statutes in the following states require that insurance be purchased: Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin.
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therefore, procurement of liability insurance, notwithstanding its statutory
authorization, cannot be such a waiver. In essence the statute only
authorizes persons who are suffering damages from the claimed negligent
acts of said cities and towns so insured, to maintain an action in the amount
of the insurance policy's coverage. Fortunately, a trend toward increasing
municipal liability is discernible. But what effect the sanctioning of
liability insurance covering immune governmental activities will have in
retarding or accelating the progress of governmental liability in Wyoming
is yet unanswered.
W. PERRY DRY

